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WILI.S-R.ELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN R.EsTRAINT OF MARRIAGE-VALIDITY AT 
COMMON LAW AND EFFECT OF SHELLEY v. KRAEMER-Testator devised and 
bequeathed his property to his children, but with a proviso that the gift to 
any child who should marry a person not born in the Hebrew faith should 
lapse. Subsequent to the testator's death, the defendant married a woman 
who had been born a Roman Catholic. The other beneficiaries brought 
· a proceeding to declare that the defendent had lost his rights under the 
will by reason of his marriage. The probate court granted a decree sub-
stantially as sought by the plaintiffs. On appeal, held, affirmed. This 
partial restraint on marriage is not so unreasonable as to render it invalid 
and the judicial enforcement of it does not contravene the First Amend-
ment guaranties of religious liberty, as applied to the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Gordon v. Gordon, (Mass. 1955) 124 N.E. (2d) 228, 
cert. den. 349 U.S. 947, 75 S.Ct. 875 (1955). 
From the time of the Romans down to the present day, testators have 
imposed restraints on marriage.1 A great many of these restraints have in-
volved religious issues.2 A partial restraint that limits marriage by the 
beneficiary to a spouse of a certain religion has generally been upheld as 
reasonable.3 On the constitutional issue the situation is not as clear. 
Prior to Shelley v. Kraemer,4 the courts summarily dismissed the constitu-
tional question on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment was merely 
a restriction on state action and was wholly inapplicable to acts by indi-
viduals, such as private contracts or wills.5 While Shelley v. Kraemer arose 
in a different context6 the Court there held that state court enforcement of 
a private agreement was state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court in the principal case did not deal at length with 
the effect of this holding; it merely stated that it seemed "to involve quite 
different considerations from the right to dispose of property by will."1 It 
is submitted that this decision and the similar holding of the Oregon court 
in United States National Bank v. Snodgrass8 are correct. There are at 
1 See Browder, "Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Marriage," 39 MICH. L. 
REV. 1288 (1941). 
2 See 122 A.L.R. 7 at 29, n. 3 (1939). 
s There is authority in Pennsylvania and Virginia that religious conditions are void 
as against the public policy of the state. It is not clear whether this policy applies to 
religious liinitations on marriage. See Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 118 A. 907 (1922); 
Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 11, 130 A. 238 (1925); Maddox v. Maddox's Admr., 11 Gratt. 
(Va.) 804 (1854). Cf. Clayton's Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1930). Except for these two 
jurisdictions, religious conditions and limitations have been universally sustained. See 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §27.20 (1952); Browder, "illegal Conditions and Limitations: 
Miscellaneous Provisions," I OKLA. L. R.Ev. 237 at 248 (1948). 
4 334 U.S. I, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). 
5 Matter of Kempf, 252 App. Div. 28 at 32, 297 N.Y.S. 307 (1937), affd. 278 N.Y. 613, 
16 N.E. (2d) 123 (1938); Magee v. O'Neill, 19 S.C. 170 at 186 (1882). 
6 The case held that state action is involved when a state court enforces a restrictive 
covenant in a deed. 334 U.S. I at 18, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). 
1 Principal case at 235. 
8202 Ore. 530, 275 P. (2d) 860 (1954). In this case the testator's daughter was to get 
the corpus of a trust at age 32, provided she was not then a Roman Catholic or had not 
married a Roman Catholic. The court held that a religious condition in partial restraint 
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least three reasons for not extending the reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer 
into this area of the law. First, these cases involve gifts and not ordinary 
business transactions. It is questionable whether a person should be al-
lowed to argue that his religious liberty is being restricted when he is 
merely given a choice between complete freedom to choose a mate and 
receiving a gift.9 Secondly, the testator also has religious rights. While 
alive, he has the right to support any religion he chooses, and, to this end, 
he can donate his money with practically any condition that he desires to 
attach.10 Since the law permits the "dead hand" to control property for a 
limited period, it is arguable that the testator has a right to provide that 
his estate should go to a person who would remain faithful to his beliefs 
and raise the testator's descendants in accordance with them.11 Thirdly, 
and perhaps most important of all, is the fact that this is a relatively 
private matter and not one of general public importance. A discriminatory 
restrictive covenant, such as was involved in Shelley v. Kraemer, operates 
in a manner similar to a local ordinance. Because they are effective only 
when they cover a fairly large tract of land, these discriminatory covenants 
deny minority groups equal protection of the laws in that they deprive 
them of a'right to acquire and own property in such a large area. Religious 
restrictions on marriage do not have this widespread effect. They are 
generally aimed only at the testator's own family and not at religious or 
racial groups in general. The distinction between these two situations can 
-be likened to the difference between a local ordinance prohibiting or 
restricting house-to-house religious solicitation12 and a sign on private prop-
erty that prohibits solicitors from entering the premises.13 
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of marriage was valid at common law and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution. The court's brief discussion of the constitutional argument is found at 
543-544. 
9 See Browder, "Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Miscellaneous Provisions,'' I 
OKLA. L. REv. 237 at 248 (1948). 
10 This argument was recognized by the court in United States National Bank v. 
Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530 at 536-540, 275 P. (2d) 860 (1954). 
Ill See 25 A.L.R. 1523 at 1524 (1923). 
::12 These ordinances are void when applied to religious solicitation. Martin v. 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 
S.Ct. 870 (1943). See also Peterman, "Municipal Control of Peddlers, Solicitors and Dis-
tributors," 22 TULANE L. REv. 284 at 288 (1947). 
13 There is every indication that this is a perfectly valid restraint on religious solici-
tation. See the language of the Court in Martin v. Struthers, supra note 12, at 147-148. 
